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• 1 • 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
INTRODUCTION 
It  is  with  great  pleasure  that  I  accept  to  speak  to  you  during  my 
visit  to  Portugal. 
The  competition  rules  of  the  European  Community 
are  an  increasingly  important  body  of  law  of  which  new  Member  States 
wishing  to  joint  the  EEC  must  be  fully  informed. 
fttherefore  seems  quite  appropriate  to  me  to  devote  some 
reflexions  on  the  competition  policy  of  the  European  Community  in 
the  view  of  Portugal's  future  accession to  the  Common  Market. 
But  firstly  I  will  say  a  few  words  on  the  general  economic  framework 
in  which  this  policy  is  pursued  and  analyse  some  of  its purposes 
and  functions. 
• •  Secondly,  I  will  give  you  a  general  view  of  the  basics  of  the  European 
Community's  competition  rules. 
Finally  I  will  make  some  comments  on  some  of  the  specific points 
which  might  arise  in  this  field  in  the  context  of  Portugal's 
accession  to  the  European  Communities. 
'  , .............  ,  .......  .  .  • 
2. 
THE  PURPOSE  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF  EUROPEAN  COMPETITION  POLICY 
I  shall  thenrore  start  to  explain  the  European  Commission's  view 
on  the  puropose  and  function  of  the  European  c~petition policy. 
It  is  clear  from  a  reading  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  (Treaty establishing 
the  European  Economic  Community),  that  the  European  Community  is 
essentially based  on  a  market  economy  in  which  fair  and  undistorted 
competition  has  a  fundamental  role  to play.This  is already  apparent 
from  one  of  the  first articles  of  that  Treaty  stating that  the 
. 
European  Community  shall  include  the  institution of  a  system 
ensuring  that  competition  in  the  Common  Market  is  not  distorted. 
In  this  context  it is  necessary  to  remind  you  from  the  start  that 
the  competition  rules  of  the  European  Treaties  have  a  constitu-
tio~al  character.  The  Community  authorities  can  pass  legislation 
.•  l  .  1rrp  ementmg  the  Treaty  rules,  but  they  cannot  change  them • 
..... 
r 
Competition  policy  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  application  of 
the  basic  rules  which  govern  the  integration of  the  European 
markets  and  contributes  to  the  creation  of  a  unified market. 
The  free  flow  of  trade  in  this  market  creates  the  need  for 
constant  structural  adaptation.  What  Europe  needs  most  of  all  is 
enterprises  which  are  capable  and  willing  to  face  competition, 
within  the  European  Common  Market  as  well  as  internationally.  The 
.•• 1  existence of  a  big  single 
.  . 
'. 
' 3. 
existence  of  a  big  single  market  is  one  of  the  most  important 
assets  for  our  enterprises.  It  provides  them  with  a  basis  for 
production  and  sale,  but  forces  them  also  to  adapt  in  order  to 
remain  competitive.  The  policy of  the  European  Community  must 
therefore  be  to  enforce  competition  rules  activ ely.  This  is  the 
best  contribution  to  enhance  the  necessary  structural  adaptations. 
Let's  now  examine  the  economic  functions  of  this  system  of 
competition.  •  • 
Its functions  are 
-to ensure  that  available  resources  are  located  to  the  most 
productive  sectors  ; 
-to stimulate  undertakings  to  make  the  best  use  of  their  knowhow 
and  skills and 
- ~o encourage  them  to  invent,  develop  and  exploit  efficiently  new 
techniques  and  new  procedures. 
The  European  Commission  firmly  believes  that  competition  is  the 
best  stimulant  of  economic  activity  sin~e it guarantees  the 
widest  possible  freedom  of  action to all.  An  active  competition 
policy  pursued  in  accordance  with  the  provision  of  the  Treaty 
makes  it easier  for  the  supply  and  demand  structures  continually 
to  adjust  to  technological  development • 
••• 1  Through  the  interplay 4. 
Through  the  interplay of decentralizes  decision-making  machinery 
competit1on  enables  and  obliges  enterprises  continuously  to  improve 
their efficiency,  which  is  the  sine  qua  non  for  a  steady  improvement 
in  living  standards  and  employment  prospects  within  the  countries  of 
the  European  Community.  Froms  this  point  of  view,  competition policy 
is  an  essential  means  for  satsifying  to  a  great  extent  the  individual 
·~and collective  needs  of  our  society. 
It  is  a  measure  of  the  importance  which  the  European  Community  attaches 
•  to  competition policy  that  this i; the  one  area  in  which  the  European 
Commission  has  its  own  autonomous  powers  of  decision-making. 
In  a  phrase,  the  competition policy which  the  Commission  is  pursuing 
is  the  maintenance  and  reinforcement  of  an  effective  competitive 
. 
structure  in  the  European  Common  Market.  One  is  facing  a  process  of 
desindustrialization  in  the  EEC,  or at  least  in  important  parts  of 
it. This  cannot  be  the  fate  of  this  highly  developed  part  of  the 
world  and  this  tendancy  must  be  reversed.  Competition policy  is  one 
of  the  instruments  to achieve  this goal. 
THE  COMPETITION  RULES  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  TREATIES 
Having  pictured the  broader objectives  of  our  competition policy,  I 
will  now  give  you  a  general  overview  of  the  basics  of  the  Community's 
competition  rules,  first  of  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community  and  there-
after of  the  EEC. 4 bis. 
But  first  it  has  t  obe  made  clear  that  there  are  two  kinds 
of  competition  rules.  First  there  are  those  which  are  intended 
for  private undertakings  and  which  I  will  comment  in  a  minute. 
But  in  addition  there  are  various  rules  which  are  intended  for 
the  Member  States  themselves  or  for  their public  sector. 
Amongst  the  Latter  are  not  only  th~  rules  on  State  subsidies 
which  I  will  not  comment  today,  but  also  the  very  important 
rules  of  nondiscrimination  embodied  in  Articles  37  and  90  of 
the  Treaty  relating  to  State  monopolies  of  a  commercial 
character  and  public  undertakings.  It  is  clear that  these  rules 
. 
are  particularly  important  in  the  context  of  the  Portuguese 
accession.  and  I  willmake  some  specific  comments  in  the  Last 
part  of  this  presentation  about  them. 
Starting  now  with  the  rules  addressed  to  private undertakings • 
•  •  • 
••• 1  The  Paris  Coal  a~  Steel 
-------··--· ... 
;I  I 
' '.  ·------~__..-· 
5. 
I 
The  Paris  Coal  and  Steel  Community  Treaty  contains  a  well-defined 
prohibition of  cartel  agreements  - subject  to'spec1fic  exemp~ions -
; 
inArticl"e 65.  The  European  Commission  has,.however,  developed  a.~ 
practice of  granting  such  exemptions  in  economically  justified •.  :,t-ro·: 
conditions,  especially  for  specialization agreements.· 
The  Coal  and  Steel  Treaty  further  forbids  the  abuse  of  dominant 
positions  and  contains  rules  of  the  control  of  mergers  in Article 66. 
These  provisions  Leave  no  room  for  application of  the  competition 
rules  in  these  sectors.  :  ..  ' 
The  application of  these  rules  of  competition takes  of  course  place 
in  connection  with  the  use  of  the  wider  power  which  this  Treaty 
gives  for  establishing  an  industrial  policy,  including  such  •  ..  "1  ~l  I 
measures  as  fixing  of  quota's  and/or  minimum  prices,  taking·special 
measures  in  the  field  of  commercial  policy  and  contro~ing the-
granting  of  State  subsidies •  • 
The  EEC  Treaty  covering  in  principle all  other  sectors  forbids 
all  types  of  agreements  or  concerted  practices  - horizontar-ps 
well  as  vertical  - in  restraint  of  competition,  by  virtue of 
·< 
Article 85,  paragraph  1.  The  second  paragraph  of  the  same  Article 
goes  on  to  say  that  prohibited  agreements  and  decisions  are 
automatically  null  and  void.  This  prohibition and  the  sanction 
"  of  nullity which  flows  from  it are  mitigated  by  a  possibility 
of  exemptions,  provided  by  paragraph  3  of  Article  85 • 
••• /Article  86  forbids 6. 
Article 86  forbids  the  abuse  of  dominant  positions.  Unlike  in 
:··  .,  '  <:.·  :·•' I:; ,.; h  " ·'  ~-,  ;_ )  ,..  .  "' ,.;  ':'  •  :  .! ·~'  ')  '  ' ':  . '  ~ •  ~ ·.  -~  '  .  ; :  ~::  :S(i:  -,  ,• 
the  Amer1can  ant1trust  rules,  however,·i~·the European  system' 
the  mere· possession  of  a  dominant  position  is  not  forbidden. 
Companies  must  engage  in  abusive  behaviour  on  the  market  to 
infringe  Article 86.  There  is  a  wide  range  of  examples  of  such 
abusive  behaviour  of  which  discrimination,  refusal  to sell and 
market  exclusion  are  the  most  obvious. 
In  this  context  it should  be  emphasized  that  the  European  Court 
of  Justice  in  Luxemburg,which  acts  as  a  Supreme  Court  for  re-
viewing  the  decisions  of  the  Commission.  has 'substantially upheld 
the  practice  of  the  Commission  and  in  particular as  regards  the 
prohibition of  abusive  behaviour  under  Article  86.  Indeed  several 
judgments  of  this  Court  confirmed  over  the  years  the  Commission's 
opposition to exclusionary practices.  refusals  to sell  and 
discriminations. 
•  • 
It  has  further  to  be  reminded  that  the  EEC  Treaty  does  not  have 
the  same  rules  on  mergers  as  the  Coal  and  Steel  Treaty.  According 
~ 
to  the  European  Court's  Continental  Can  decision  the  Comm~ssion 
can  invoke  Article  86  against  mergers  which  reinforce  or  extend 
an  already  exi!ting  dominant  position. 
Nevertheless,  the  fact  remains  that  the  Commission's  powers  of 
intervention and  control  are  inadequate  to deal  effectively  with 
all  concentration  situations  capable  of  harming  competition. 
The  Commission  is  therefore  trying  to  get  is  powers  extended • 
••• /  A draft  regulation  for 7. 
. ' 
•'  .. 
'  J'ol\ 
·A  draft  regulation for  merger·~o~trol has  been,under  d~scussion;-
•  ',  •  ~'  ')  'J  '  • ,"  .t 
by  the  Community's  main  Law-making  body,  the  Council  of. Ministers, 
for  several  years.  It  is  based  on  Article  235  of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
This  is  a  "cover-all" provision which  allows  the ·community  law-
making  bodies  to fill  in  for  gaps  in  the  Treaty  if this  is 
necessary  for  the  Common  Market  to operate  properly or  to  achieve 
one  of  its goals. 
The  European  Parliament  had  already  long  ago  given  a  favourable 
opinion  on  the  Commission's  proposed  draft  regulation.  However, 
the  Council  of  Ministers  could  not  come  to  adopt  it.  Thi~ was  the 
reason  why  the  Commission  has  modified  its proposal  on  several 
points  in 1981.  In·~  resolution of  November  1983,  the  Parliament 
rene~ed its  backing  to  the  amended  proposal  of  the  Commission/). 
'  taking  it upon  itself to  make  some  further  suggestions ·about  t~e 
dr"t.  The  Commission•finally  a~red during  the  December  session 
of  the  Parliament  Last  year  that  it would  incorporate  most  of 
these  suggestions  into  its draft  and  make  a  new  attempt  in  the 
Council  of  Ministers  calling  for  final  adoption.  ...... 
* 
It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  EEC  Treaty's  rules  on 
competition  apply  to  restrictive or  abusive  practices  by  under-
takings  situated  in  non-member  countries  where  their  conduct  has 
'  an  appreciable  impact  within  the  Common  Market.  The  European 
Commission  was  thus  one  of  the  first  antitrust  authorities  to 
have  applied  this  internal  effect  theory  to  foreign  companies, 
•••  1  both  to their advantage 
, 8. 
both  to  t~eir advantage  and  to their detriment.  According  to 
this  theory  the  jurisdiction of  the  European  Community  is 
established  as  soon  as  a  behaviour  has  a  perceptible  effect 
inside  the  European  Common  Market.  Putting  the  theory  into 
practice  can,  it  is  true,  have  repercussions  outside  the  European 
Community  :  but  that  is  not  a  reason  for  regarding  it as  an 
inadmissible  exercise  of  extra-territorial  jurisdiction.  To 
assert  the  contrary  would  be  tantamount  to  preventing  public  or 
juridical authorities  from  effectively  deali~g with  competition 
cases falling  within  their  jurisdiction.  It  is,  however,  clear 
that  the  Commission  exercises  political  control  over  the  exercise 
of  that  jurisdiction and  can  take  various  considerations  into 
account  when  exercising  it. 
The  Commission  shares  ~ith the national  Courts  of  the  Member  •• 
States  the  power  to  enforce  the  competition  rules.  Since 
Article  85<1>  and  86  are  directly applicable,  individuals  are 
free  to  invoke  them  before  national  Courts.  Any  questions~at 
may  arise on  the  interpretation of  the  provisions  can  be  referred 
to  the  European  Court  of  Justice.  Its  decision  is  binding  on  the 
referring  Court. 
Even  if  in  the  enforcement  of  Community  competition  law,  actions 
before  the  national  Courts  have  not  gained  the  importance  of 
treble damage  actions  under  US  antitrust  law,  it  has  to  be  made 
••• 1  clear  that  the "·  • 
...  ,f'.,.  .....  ~  ...  .  '  .. 
9. 
clear  that  the  enforcement  of  these  competition  rules  through 
national  Courts  is  of  great  importance  to  the  proper  functioning 
of  the  system.  This  is  why  the  Commission  is  at  present  studying 
the possibility of  further  legislative action  to  strengthen  su~h 
enforcement  by  private damage  actions. 
The  enforcement  of  these  rules  is  also  backed  by  the  possibility 
for  the  European  Commission  to  impose  fines  when  infringements 
have  been  established.  The  maount  of  those  fines  - which  cannot 
exceed  10  X of  total  annual  turnover  - are  svbject  to  appeal 
procedures  before  the  European  Court  of  Justice·in  Luxemburg. 
Last  but  not  Least  it has  to  be  mentioned  that  the  European 
Commission  has  the  exclusive  power  to  make  exemptions  from  the 
interdictions  of  the  competition  rules  by  virtue of  paragraph  3 
of  Article  85.  The  Commission  can  exercise  this  power  either by 
way  r1f  individual  decision  or  by  way  ofgenerally  applicable 
regulations  which  it has  been  authorised  to  adopt  by-the  Council 
of  Ministers.  These  regulations  are  called  block  e~emptions. :··  -... 
Several  ones  have  already  been  passed  such  as  those  concerni~g 
exclusive distribution or  exclusive  purchase  agreements  and  one 
concerning  specialization agreements;  several  more  are  presently 
in  preparation to  be  adopted  in  1984;  amongst  these  are  to  be 
mentioned  those  concerning  patent  Licenses,  cooperation  in  the 
field  of  Research  and  Development  and  selective distribution  in 
the  automobile  sector. 
• •• !It is  therefore 10. 
It  is  therefore  to  be  expected  that  this  power  to grant  such 
exemptions  will  become  the  major  instrument  by  which  the 
European  Commission  steers  its competition  policy  in  coordination 
with  the  other  policies  of  the  European  Communities. 
Competition  policy  thus  becomes  part  of  the  overall  economic 
policy  the  Commission  is  pursuing.  This  is  not  surprising  since 
the  European  Court  already  indicated  in  one  of  its  judgments  in 
· 1969  that 
" ••• Article  85  of  the  EEC  Treaty  applies  to all the 
undertakings  in  the  Community  whose  conduct  it governs 
either by  prohibitions  or  by  means  of  exemptions, 
granted  - subject  to  conditions  which  it specifies  -
in  favour  of  agreements  which  contribute  to  improving 
~he production ot distribution of  goods  or  to  promoting 
• 
technical  or  economic  progress.  While  the  Treaty's 
primary  objects  is to eliminate  by  this  means  the 
obstacles  to the  free  movement  of  goods  within the  ~ 
r 
common  market  and  to  confirm  and  safeguard  the  unity 
of  that  market,  it also  permits  action  with  a  view  to 
promoting  a  harmonious  development  of  economic  activities 
within  the  whole  Community,  in  accordance  with  Article  2 
of  the  Treaty •••• " 
••• 1  A Link  therefore 11 • 
A Link  therefore exists  between  the  economic  objectives of 
Article  2  of  the  Treaty  and  the  competition  rules.  and  in particular 
with  Article 85/3.  This  explains  why  the  Eunopean  Commission ·does 
not  Limit  itself to  merely  apply  the  competition  rules  of  the  Treaty 
as  a  prosecution  authority  would  do,  but  conducts  a  real  policy 
in  this  field. 
III.  SOME  SPECIFIC  POINTS  RELATED  TO  THE  PORTUGESE  ACCESSION 
' . 
In  the  context  of  the  application  of  the  European  competition 
rules  to  Portugal  after  its accession  to  the  European  Community, 
several  points  seem  worth  mentioning.  First  there  is  the  question 
of  the  date  at  which  the  application  of  the  new  system  starts. 
Other  questions  relate  more  to  public  undertakings  and  State 
monopolies  of  a  commercial  character • 
•  • 
Concerning  the  transition it  has  to  be  recalled  that  in  the 
case  of  the  previous  accessions  of  the  United  Kingdom,. Denmack 
r 
and  Ireland  in  1973  and  of  Greece  in  1981,  the  application  of 
articles  85  aad  86  to  the  new  Member  States  was  organised  in 
an  identical  way. 
Indeed,  these  rules  were  made  immediately  and  directly applicable 
to  these  new  Member  States  on  the  very  date  of  accession 
without  any  transition period.  Nevertheless,  a  special  period 
.••  1  of  six months 
' 12. 
of  six  months  was  introduced  in  the  implementing  regulation 
to  permit  some  implementing  rules  to  apply. 
According  to  a  special  provision  in  an  additional  Article 
introduced  in  the  implementing  Regulation,  restrictive agreements 
existing  at  the dateof  accession  and  to  which  Article  85  applies 
by  virtue of  that  accession  had  to  be  notified within  six  months 
. from  the  date  of  accession.  During  this  same  period  these 
agreements  were  also  immune  of  fines  in  as  far  as  they  had  been 
notified during  that  period. Undertakings  had,  therefore,  the 
.. 
possibility to notify  these  agreements  either  in  their existing 
form  or,  preferably,  after having  modified  them  to  adopt  them 
to  the  requirements  of  the  competition  rules  of  the  Treaty.  No 
special difficulties were  encountered  at  the  occasion of  the 
previous  accessions  in the operation of  this  system • 
• 
It  is  therefore  to  be  expected  that  an  identical  system  will 
apply  in  the  case  of  Portugese  accession.  As  was  the  case  for 
~ 
r 
previous  accessions,  the  services  of  the  Commission  remain  at 
the  disposal  of  undertakings  should  specific  problems  arise. 
Another  point  worth  mentioning  concerns  the  application  of  the 
competition  rules  to  public  undertakings.  As  you  well  know, 
the  EEC  Treaty  has  a  specific  position  in  Article  90  ensuring 
••• /  that  Member  States ··-·--·-~ 
13. 
that  Member  States  shall,  regarding  this  public  undertakings, 
neither  enact  nor  maintain  in  force  any  measures  contrary  to 
the  rules  of  the  Treaty  and  in  particualr to  the  rules  of 
competition.  This  rule  also  becomes  directly  applicable  upon 
the  date  of  accession  of  a  new  Member  state.  I  deem  it  therefore 
necessary  to  make  a  few  comments  on  this  point. 
Article  90  does  in  no  way  limit  the  freedom  of  a  Member  State 
to decide  the  scope  and  the  composition  of  its public  sector, 
and  this  in  pursuit  of  its specific  economic  and  social 
objectives.  Article  90  only  aims  to  ensure  that  the  exercise 
of  this  freedom  does  not  negatively  effect  the  correct 
application of  the  Treaty principles  and  rules  and  of  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  economic  Common  Market  it created. 
The  ~'timate goal  of  Article  90  is  therefore  to  create  a 
guarantee  between  the  Member  States  on  a  basis  of  reciprocity 
for  the possibilities  of  economic  interpenetration which  the 
...... 
EEC  Treaty  provides,  regardless  of  the  - sometimes  very  different  -
importance  of  their public  sector.  This  is  the  balance  established 
by  the  EEC  Treaty  between  the  general  community  interest  and 
the  exercise  of  this  retained  power  of  the  Member  States • 
•••  1  And  of  course  it  is 14. 
And  of  course  it  is  not  contested  that  the  exercise  of  this 
retained  power  could  obey  in  the  various  Member  States  to 
different  economic  and  social  choices  resulting  from  their 
democratic  decision  making  process. 
Turning  now  to  competition  rules,  which  are  specifically 
mentioned  in  Article  90,  it  has  to  be  pointed  out  that  this 
provision  ensures  that  public  undertakings  cannot  engage  in 
restrictive practices  and  abuses  of  dominant  positions. 
Possible  instructions  by  Member  States  to one  or more  of  its 
undertakings  to  infringe  competition  rules  would  therefore  be 
illegal. _It  would  be  the  task  of  the  European  Commission  to 
put  an  end  to  such  infringements  when  they  are  discovered,  with 
recourse  to  the  infringement  procedures  of  the  Treaty  when  •  • 
necessary. 
The  existence  of  such  infringements  would,  however,  not  ~nstitute 
a  good  excuse  for  these  public  undertakings  since  they  also 
remain  directly  exposed  to  the  interdictions  of  Artjcles  85  and 
86.  They  could  of  course  under  certain  circumstances  benefit 
from  the  exemptions  based  on  Article  85  C3),  which  have  for 
public  undertakings  to  be  completed  by  those  exemptions  provided 
I 
for  in  Article  90  (2>.  These  Latter  exemptions  concern 
specifically enterprises  charged  with  the  management  of  services 
of  general  economic  interest • 
••• /The  excact  scope  of  this 
t 15. 
'I' 
The  exact  scope  of  this  latter  ex~mption.,for certa.i.n ,pub~j~c, 
...  ...  •••  ·•.:  l  t 
ent~rpriies must  be  established  by  the  Europea~ Commission  on 
a  case  to  case  basis.  It  has,  however,  to  be  remembered  that 
the  development  of  trade  may  not  be  effected  to  such  a  degree 
as  would  be  contrary  to  the  interest  of  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
It  seems  also  of  great  interest  to  say  in  a  few  words  something 
about  the  State  monopolies  of  a  commercial  character.  The 
Commission  emphasizes  its  Large  interest  in  these monopolies  since 
they  must  be  in  conformity  with  the  EEC  Treaty. 
Generally  speaking,  State  monopolies  are  contrary  to  the  free 
functioning  of  the  Common  Market.  They  disturb  competition  and 
especially  the  imports  of  products  from  other  Member  States. 
This  is  the  reason  why  the  Treaty  has  imposed  the  rule  in 
Article  37  that  they  should  apply  without  discriminations. 
"" 
At  the  moment  at  which  Portugal  will  become  a  member  of  the 
Community,  the  existing  monopolies  will  in  principle  have~ 
be  adapted  to  this  requirement  of  the  Community  Legislation. 
It  is,  of  course,  possible  to  provide  that  the  existing  monopolies 
should  be  adapted  during  a  transitional  period.  Portugal  would 
then  be  obliged  to  ensure  that  abovementioned  discriminations 
will :be  abolished.  In  the  case  of  Greece  it  had,  however,  been 
••• /decided that  as  from 
'. 
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decided  that  as  from  the  moment  of  accession  to  the  European 
Communities  the  new  Member  State  should  already  abolish  all 
exclusive  export  rights  and  some  exclusive  import  for  specific 
products.  For  the  remaining  adaptation  a  five  year  transition 
period  was  foreseen. 
I  understand  that  the  negotiations  on  State  monopolies  with 
Portugal  still have  to start.  I  do  hope  that  there will  be  a 
clear understanding  to  both  partners  about  the  application  of 
this  provision.  I  do  also  hope  that  we  can  close  the  negotiations 
about  this  topic  very  soon. 
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